Capacitism and the transparency of evidence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21501904 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ram Neta (0000-0002-0903-9468, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill North Carolina USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 219-226 |
| Publication date | 2022-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mind & Language (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0268-1064 • E-ISSN: 1468-0017 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/mila.12325 |
| OpenAlex | W4224113358 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 7 |
Susanna Schellenberg develops a unified account—“capacitism”—of perceptual content, phenomenology, and epistemic force. In this paper, I raise questions about her arguments for a capacitist account of evidential force, and then challenge her claim that such an account, even if correct, demands that our evidence be less than fully transparent to us
Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Perception · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |