Why I am not a literalist
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21501914 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Zoe Drayson (0000-0002-1665-3319, Department of Philosophy University of California, Davis Davis California USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 661-670 |
| Publication date | 2020-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mind & Language (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0268-1064 • E-ISSN: 1468-0017 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/mila.12306 |
| OpenAlex | W3109462655 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 9 |
Carrie Figdor argues for literalism, a semantic claim about psychological predicates, on the basis of a scientific claim about the nature of psychological properties. I argue that her scientific claim is based on controversial interpretations of scientific modelling, and that even if it were correct it would not justify her claims that psychological predicates are undergoing radical conceptual change
Epistemology · Psychological science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Social Psychology · Social Representations and Identity
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2024 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |