Confusion and explanation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21501941 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rachel Goodman (0000-0002-4360-4344, Department of Philosophy University of Illinois Chicago Illinois USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 434-444 |
| Publication date | 2024-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mind & Language (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0268-1064 • E-ISSN: 1468-0017 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/mila.12510 |
| OpenAlex | W4394816618 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 9 |
In Talking about , Unnsteinsson defends an intentionalist theory of reference by arguing that confused referential intentions degrade reference. Central to this project is a “belief model” of both identity confusion and unconfused thought. By appealing to a well‐known argument from Campbell, I argue that this belief model falls short, because it fails to explain the inferential behavior it promises to explain. Campbell's argument has been central in the contemporary literature on Frege's puzzle, but Unnsteinsson's account of confusion provides an opportunity for more clarity about how the argument is best interpreted, and what it shows
CLARITY · Confusion · Epistemology · Psychoanalysis · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |