Against the mind package view of minds
Comments on Carrie Figdor's Pieces of mind
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21501975 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eric Schwitzgebel (0000-0003-4908-7074, Department of Philosophy University of California, Riverside Riverside California USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 671-676 |
| Publication date | 2020-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mind & Language (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0268-1064 • E-ISSN: 1468-0017 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/mila.12288 |
| OpenAlex | W3106964437 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 13 |
Carrie Figdor's Pieces of mind lays the groundwork for critiquing the mind package view of minds. According to the mind package view, psychological properties travel in groups, such that an entity either has the whole mind package or lacks mentality altogether. Implicit commitment to the mind package view makes it seem absurd to attribute some psychological properties (e.g., preferences) to entities that lack other psychological properties (e.g., feelings). Contra the mind package view, we are psychologically continuous with plants, worms, and bacteria: Our patterns of mindedness resemble theirs, even if such entities do not have the whole mind package
Aesthetics · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Computational theory of mind · Epistemology · Feeling · Metaphysics · Mind–body problem · Philosophy of mind · Theory of mind · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |