Censorship Bubbles Vs Hate Bubbles

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21503594
AutoresWendy Xin (0000-0003-2694-9751, Discipline of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen38
Número4
Páginas446-457
Fecha de publicación2024-07-03
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaSocial Epistemology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0269-1728 • E-ISSN: 1464-5297
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/02691728.2023.2274324
OpenAlexW4388421007
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas29

In this paper, I argue that considerations of epistemic bubbles can give us reason to defend censorship of hate speech. Although censoring hate speech leads to epistemic bubbles (‘censorship bubbles’), they tend to be less epistemically problematic than epistemic bubbles generated by the circulation of hate speech (‘hate bubbles’). Because hate speech silences its target groups and creates the illusion that the dominant group identities are threatened, hate bubbles are likely more restrictive in structure than censorship bubbles and have a stronger tendency to turn into echo chambers where opposing views are actively discredited. Therefore, I argue that censorship bubbles might be a minor price we ought to pay to avoid hate bubbles. Additionally, my analysis shows that we cannot focus exclusively on the content or the structure of epistemic bubbles, since their content can partly determine their structure, as is in the case of hate bubbles

Censorship · Cognitive psychology · Cosmic censorship hypothesis · Economics · Epistemology · Illusion · Physics · Political science · Sociology · Theoretical physics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Hate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology