Normative force of appeals to personhood in dementia care

In this paper, I critically examine Kitwood's account of personhood for people with dementia. His account has been influential in supporting appeals to personhood in both clinical and bioethical literature on dementia care. I demonstrate that Kitwood's account does not run into common objections against invoking personhood as a normative notion, namely, the objection of exclusionary implications and the objection of redundancy. I argue, however, that Kitwood's account suffers from two other major conceptual issues. These include (a) unreasonable social contingency, and thus, precariousness, of his notion of personhood for people with dementia; and (b) insufficient theoretical connection between his account of personhood and his proposed list of indicators of well‐being for people with dementia. Despite these issues, I do not agree with the following view: that, in the context of dementia care, scholars should refrain from appealing to personhood considerations. Instead, I defend the view that while Kitwood fails to offer a compelling theoretical account of personhood of people with dementia, his empirically driven list of indicators of well‐being and his notion of malignant social phycology seem to be sensitive to key ethical considerations relevant to dementia care. I propose that we pursue alternative ways of explaining what is morally (un) desirable about them without (explicit) appeal to personhood

Appeal · Bioethics · Dementia · Disease · Epistemology · Law and economics · Normative · Personhood · Political science · Sociology · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Medicine · Patient Dignity and Privacy · Philosophy · Psychology

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