Book Symposium on Ernest Sosa’s Epistemic Explanations
Knowledge, Justification, Belief, and Suspension
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21507120 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Clayton Littlejohn (0000-0003-2126-6169, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 371-384 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Topics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0276-2080 • E-ISSN: 2154-154X |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/philtopics202149230 |
| OpenAlex | W4286392613 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 5 |
In this paper, I want to discuss a problem that arises when we try to understand the connections between justification, knowledge, and suspension. The problem arises because some prima facie plausible claims about knowledge and the justification for judging and suspending are difficult to reconcile with the possibility of a kind of knowledge or apt belief that a thinker cannot aptly judge to be within her reach. I shall argue that if we try (as we should) to accommodate the possibility of this kind of knowledge, we should reject a widely held view about justification. We can correct this mistaken view about the connection between justification and knowledge by connecting justification to a kind of competence, but not the one we might have expected. In the course of this discussion, I shall flag some questions about the explanatory ambitions of the telic virtue-theoretic approach
Epistemology · Prima facie · Virtue · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |