Reasoning and Presuppositions

Bibliographic Data

ID21507170
AuthorsCarlotta Pavese (0000-0003-0759-8853, Cornell University, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume49
Issue2
Pages203-224
Publication date2021-01-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Topics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0276-2080 • E-ISSN: 2154-154X
PublisherPhilosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.5840/philtopics202149222
OpenAlexW4286393367
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited11

It is a platitude that when we reason, we often take things for granted, sometimes even justifiably so. Although it is a platitude that we often take things for granted when we reason—whether justifiably or not—one might think that we do not have to. In fact, it is a natural expectation that were we not pressed by time, lack of energy or focus, we could always in principle make explicit in the form of premises every single presupposition we make in the course of our reasoning. In other words, it is natural to expect it to be true that presuppositionless reasoning is possible. In this essay, I argue that it is false: presuppositionless reasoning is impossible. Indeed, I think this is one of the lessons of a long-standing paradox about inference and reasoning known as Lewis Carroll's (1985) regress of the premises. Many philosophers agree that Carroll's regress teaches us something foundational about reasoning. I part ways about what it is that it teaches us. What it teaches us is that the structure of reasoning is constitutively presuppositional

Epistemology · Presupposition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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