A Different Solution to the Generality Problem for Process Reliabilism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21507202 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alvin I Goldman (0000-0003-0793-4589, corresponding author), Alvin Goldman |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 105-111 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Topics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0276-2080 • E-ISSN: 2154-154X |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/philtopics202149217 |
| OpenAlex | W4286392513 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
According to process reliabilism, a person's belief is justified just in case it is generated by a reliable belief-forming process. If somebody merely wishes that P is true, and proceeds to believe it for that reason only, the belief is not justified. Some critics of reliabilism, however, point out that each token process that causes a particular belief is of numerous different types, which can vary in reliability. So, which type must be sufficiently reliable? Process reliabilism needs to solve this "generality" problem. However, I argue that this requirement is overly stringent. As long as a target believer actually does employ a reliable belief forming process to arrive at his/her belief, that believer can rightly be credited with holding the belief justifiedly. The believer need not know what the details of the process are
Economics · Generality · Programming language · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Computer Science · Fault Detection and Control Systems · Philosophy · Risk and Safety Analysis
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |