Meeting the Evil God Challenge

Bibliographic Data

ID21507828
AuthorsBen Page (0000-0003-3523-802X, Philosophy Department Durham University), Max Baker‐hytch (0000-0002-5106-7219, Philosophy Department University of Oxford)
Year2020
Volume101
Issue3
Pages489-514
Publication date2020-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePacific philosophical quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0279-0750 • E-ISSN: 1468-0114
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/papq.12304
OpenAlexW3000985610
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited31

The evil God challenge is an argumentative strategy that has been pursued by a number of philosophers in recent years. It is apt to be understood as a parody argument: a wholly evil, omnipotent and omniscient God is absurd, as both theists and atheists will agree. But according to the challenge, belief in evil God is about as reasonable as belief in a wholly good, omnipotent and omniscient God; the two hypotheses are roughly epistemically symmetrical. Given this symmetry, thesis belief in an evil God and belief in a good God are taken to be similarly preposterous. In this paper, we argue that the challenge can be met, suggesting why the three symmetries that need to hold between evil God and good God – intrinsic, natural theology and theodicy symmetries – can all be broken. As such, we take it that the evil God challenge can be met

Argumentative · Belief in God · Epistemology · Existence of God · Problem of Evil · Theism · Theodicy · Theology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · War, Ethics, and Justification

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