Dolo Como Vontade? Uma Defesa Do Dolo Como Representação - Doi
10.12818/P.0304-2340.2023v83p141
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21510480 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eduardo Viana (0000-0003-2503-9318, Universidade Federal da Bahia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Issue | 83 |
| Publication date | 2023-12-31 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Revista da Faculdade de Direito da UFMG (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0304-2340 • E-ISSN: 1984-1841 |
| Publisher | Revista da Faculdade de Direito da UFMG (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.12818/p.0304-2340.2023v83p141 |
| OpenAlex | W4395098598 |
| Language | PT |
| References cited | 5 |
The line separating dolus eventualis, as the weaker form of intent, from culpa is a central issue within Criminal Law. In the praxis of Criminal Law, the distinction between each of these mens rea elements has an extraordinary importance. The motivation for working with this subject came from the tension between two different perspectives. One group of voluntaristic oriented authors base their distinction upon a volition. On the other side, there are authors who take a cognitivistic approach, drawing the line upon the representation of the perpetrator. In order to bring up an efficient debate, this article discusses the structure of dolus and after showing the unsustainability of a volitional concept of dolus, a cognitive proposal of dolus is presented
| Highly cited | No |
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