Identity-relative paternalism is internally incoherent
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21515053 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eli Garrett Schantz (0000-0001-5267-1373, Indiana University South Bend, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 404-405 |
| Publication date | 2023-06-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Medical Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0306-6800 • E-ISSN: 1473-4257 |
| Publisher | BMJ (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1136/jme-2023-109009 |
| PMID | 37024295 |
| OpenAlex | W4362677893 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 1 |
Identity-Relative Paternalism, as defended by Wilkinson, holds that paternalistic intervention is justified to prevent an individual from doing to their future selves (where there are weakened prudential unity relations between the current and future self) what it would be justified to prevent them from doing to others.1 Wilkinson, drawing on the work of Parfit and others, defends the notion of Identity-Relative Paternalism from a series of objections. I argue here, however, that Wilkinson overlooks a significant problem for Identity-Relative Paternalism—namely, that it yields unactionable and self-contradictory results when applied to choices where both options present potential harms to future selves
Data science · Paternalism · Political science · Computer Science · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |