Disentangling politics in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21521214 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hussain Sinan (0000-0002-7441-1684, Dalhousie University, corresponding author), Megan Bailey (0000-0003-0096-1808, Dalhousie University), Wilf Swartz (0000-0002-0829-765X, Dalhousie University) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 133 |
| Pages | 104781 |
| Publication date | 2021-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Marine Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0308-597X • E-ISSN: 1872-9460 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104781 |
| OpenAlex | W3200101141 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 35 |
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) require countries with diverse objectives, aspirations, and interests to cooperate to sustainably manage transboundary fish stocks. These organizations are often subjected and are held responsible for overfishing, slow management responses and failure to follow scientific evidence. Disappointing performance is often attributed to a ‘black box of politics’ or a ‘lack of political will’ among members. Disentangling the politics and motivations behind RFMO decision-making is crucial in understanding how they function and why they might fail. Here, we analysed eight socio-economic indicators to identify the priorities of 30 members of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and conducted 41 interviews with key stakeholders to understand their engagement strategies. This study also focuses on how different actors engage, negotiate, and leverage their political power in the development and adoption of Conservation and Management Measure proposals. Our results demonstrate that socio-economic interests, political and economic influences, and management priorities converge on IOTC members to inform their negotiation positions. Even though individual domestic interests drive the decisions taken by members, we identified 34 unique entities that influence member decisions in the IOTC. Additionally, members with tuna interests influence other members, in particular developing States. Further, the decisions by members are not necessarily based on tuna management but tied to sovereignty, foreign aid, and other development aspects outside the realm of the RFMO decision-making. Our findings also indicate the importance of defining clear ownership of the resource and the critical role of various stakeholders
Business · Commission · Fish · Fisheries management · Fishery · Fishing · Negotiation · Overfishing · Political science · Politics · Sovereignty · Sustainability · Tuna · Coral and Marine Ecosystems Studies · Law · Marine and fisheries research · Marine Bivalve and Aquaculture Studies · Finance
An expanded evaluation of global fisheries management organizations on the high seas
The MSC approach for developing harvest strategies and harvest control rules for Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs)
The plight of the fishers and the management of IUU fishing
Status of fisheries management in the Indian Ocean
Be careful what you wish (fish) for
Fact or fiction? Unpacking the terminologies used in fisheries allocation discussions
Subsidies and allocation
The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020
How transparent are RFMOs? Achievements and challenges
Can Greater Transparency improve the Sustainability of Pacific Fisheries
The black box of power in polycentric environmental governance
The paradox of sustainable tuna fisheries in the Western Indian Ocean
Political Responsibility in Transnational NGO Advocacy
Resource allocation in transboundary tuna fisheries
Materializing the blue economy
Civil conflict and world fisheries, 1952-2004
Mapping ocean-state Mauritius and its unlaid ghosts
The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas
The Tuna 'Commodity Frontier
| Citations per year | 1.75 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |