The Dependence of Rational Agency on Various Forms of Powerlessness
Lessons on the Relation Between Wille and Willkuer
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21539759 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sarah Buss (University of Michigan, corresponding author), Philosophy Documentation Center |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Pages | 25-44 |
| Publication date | 2024-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Midwest Studies in Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0363-6550 • E-ISSN: 1475-4975 |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/msp202532556 |
| OpenAlex | W4409825703 |
| Language | EN |
Passivity is the opposite of activity. And yet in order to do something intentionally, one must be passive in certain respects. In this essay, I identify three forms of passivity that are necessary conditions of intentional action, contrast these forms of passivity with a fourth form that is incompatible with intentional action, and explore the relationships among all four. In so doing, I call attention to the complex relationship between our capacity to will and our capacity to reason
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Sociology · Economic Theory and Institutions · Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
|---|