Two Kinds of Desire Theory of Well-Being
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21539762 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eden Lin (0000-0001-8210-8995, corresponding author), Philosophy Documentation Center |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Pages | 55-86 |
| Publication date | 2022-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Midwest Studies in Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0363-6550 • E-ISSN: 1475-4975 |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/msp202212231 |
| OpenAlex | W4312753010 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
Which entities should the desire theory of well-being deem basically good for you—good for you in the most fundamental way? On the object view, what is basically good for you when one of your desires is satisfied is the object of that desire. On the combo view, what is basically good for you when one of your desires is satisfied is the combination or conjunction of the object of that desire and the fact that you have that desire. I argue that which of these views the desire theory accepts makes no difference to what it implies about anyone’s amount of well-being. Then, I consider the main arguments that have been given for the superiority of one or the other of those two views. Finding none of those arguments persuasive, I conclude that we lack good grounds for rejecting the initial impression that it would be natural to have about those views: that it does not matter which of them the desire theory accepts
Aesthetics · Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Form of the Good · Linguistics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citations per year | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |