Political economy of aid allocation
The case of Arab donors
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21543077 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ahsan Kibria (0000-0003-0972-1341, College of Agriculture and Applied Sciences Utah State University Logan UT USA, corresponding author), Reza Oladi (0000-0002-4621-7622, College of Agriculture and Applied Sciences Utah State University Logan UT USA), Ryan Bosworth (College of Agriculture and Applied Sciences Utah State University Logan UT USA) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 2460-2495 |
| Publication date | 2021-08-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | World Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0378-5920 • E-ISSN: 1467-9701 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/twec.13139 |
| OpenAlex | W3160526713 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 40 |
By exploiting a unique data set on aid allocation by major Arab donors, this paper explores the relationship between aid allocation and the strategic alignment of donors with recipients as well as the developmental need of recipients. To motivate our empirical work, we first develop a new theory of aid allocation, wherein a representative donor country's payoff depends on both the well‐being of the representative recipient country as well as its strategic alignment with the donor. Our theoretical model suggests that there exists a positive relationship between donor's aid allocation and the geopolitical and cultural alignment of the recipient country. Our model also predicts that donors allocate more aid to recipient countries with higher levels of country capacity. To test the prediction of our theory empirically, we construct a new measure of geopolitical and cultural alignment for recipient countries by using principal component analysis. We employ this measure and a set of control variables to show that the geopolitical and cultural alignment of a recipient country and its capacity to implement development projects are the key determinants of aid allocation from the Arab donors
Economic system · Economics · Geopolitics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Computer Science · Economic Growth and Development · International Development and Aid · Religion, Society, and Development
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| Citations per year | 1.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |