High‐Profile Attacks, Regimes of Criminal Governance and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21543527 |
|---|---|
| Autores | J Eduardo Ibarra‐Olivo (0000-0002-3873-2886, Henley Business School University of Reading Reading UK, autor de correspondencia), Sandra Ley (0000-0001-8141-9273, Tecnologico de Monterrey Ciudad de México Mexico), Covadonga Meseguer (0000-0002-8469-3988, ICAI‐ICADE Universidad Pontificia Comillas Madrid Spain) |
| Año | 2025 |
| Volumen | 48 |
| Número | 7 |
| Páginas | 1732-1752 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2025-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | World Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0378-5920 • E-ISSN: 1467-9701 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/twec.13723 |
| OpenAlex | W4410522830 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 50 |
This paper examines the influence of high‐profile attacks (HPAs) on foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexican municipalities. HPAs target political officials and signal attempts by organised criminal groups (OCGs) to dominate the local organisation of the communities under their influence. Such efforts to establish criminal governance controls can potentially create a stable environment conducive to FDI. Using a data set on HPAs and analysing their impact on sectoral FDI at the municipal level between 2007 and 2013 in Mexico, we find that HPAs do not discourage foreign investment. However, this effect depends on whether the establishment of criminal governance occurs amid widespread violence. Under conditions of generalised violence, the stabilising influence of HPAs has a negative effect on FDI, especially in the commerce and service sectors. Our findings offer new insights into the conditions under which organised crime affects FDI, contributing to an ongoing debate
Business · Corporate governance · Criminology · Economics · Foreign direct investment · Organised crime · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Corruption and Economic Development · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies · Law · Psychology · Finance
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| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |