The strengths of social constructivism

A critical dialogue with Boghossian

Bibliographic Data

ID21549501
AuthorsReza Esmkhani (University of Religions and Denominations, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume39
Issue3
Pages333-352
Publication date2025-01-21
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTHEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0495-4548 • E-ISSN: 2171-679X
PublisherEHU Press (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1387/theoria.25981
OpenAlexW4406701210
LanguageEN
References cited5

This article has three purposes. First, it illustrates the strengths of social constructivism (SC) as a major thesis and its two interrelated corollaries: the “social dependency” thesis, the “communitarian” theory of meaning, and the “contingency” view of knowledge. Second, by underscoring these strengths, it will show how one can counter the anti-social critique of the kind Boghossian espouses, highlighting some genuine disagreements that cannot be resolved by appealing to the assumptions and resources that are at the heart of the matter in the first place. To this end, the following points will be discussed: (1) Boghossian misses the mark primarily by focusing his main critique not on “social dependency” but on a conceptually different doctrine, namely “relativism” (defined as the “social relativity” thesis); (2) he criticizes SC by presupposing the very “non-social” view of meaning that SC was originally proposed to attack; and (3) the logic of SC “debunks” the very epistemic system on which Boghossian relies by claiming that it is as dependent on “(historical) contingencies” as any other. Finally, some responses are offered to “rationalist” concerns, which are mainly concerned with the application of SC’s logic to its own arguments

Epistemology · Political science · Social constructivism · Sociology · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Law · Philosophy

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Open DOIOpen Access