Thoughts about oneself to share in context

Meeting Bermúdez’s challenge

Bibliographic Data

ID21549504
AuthorsVÍCTOR M VERDEJO (0000-0002-7872-0206, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, corresponding author)
Year2025
Publication date2025-06-11
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTHEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0495-4548 • E-ISSN: 2171-679X
PublisherEHU Press (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1387/theoria.26297
OpenAlexW4411376251
LanguageEN
References cited6

Suppose you utter the sentence “I am a professional philosopher”. Can I –or anybody else – literally express the same thought you thereby expressed? An affirmative answer implies a potential split between the referent of the thought you expressed and its thinker, as well as the possibility of expressing that thought without using the first person pronoun. Here I attempt to clarify the basic features of a reference rule individuating such an intersubjectively shareable type of thought, i.e. the self type. Doing so requires meeting Bermúdez’s (2019) challenge, namely, the challenge of determining (a) in virtue of what is an individual the referent but not necessarily the thinker of the thought in such cases, and (b) what makes it the case that a sentence is used to express a self type of thought, as opposed to a thought of another type. I advance an elucidation that is entirely congenial to Bermúdez’s own account in terms of location abilities. Contrary to what he suggests, however, the analysis plausibly remains one at the level of the contextually constrained type (or instantiable type), and leads to a revision – if not a straightforward rejection – of Frege’s Criterion for the individuation of thought

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