Defending the motivational theory of desire
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21549533 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Pineda-Oliva (0000-0002-2505-7551, Universitat de Girona, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Publication date | 2021-03-17 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | THEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0495-4548 • E-ISSN: 2171-679X |
| Publisher | EHU Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1387/theoria.21489 |
| OpenAlex | W3137677257 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 9 |
In this paper I offer a defense of the motivational theory of desire. According to the motivational view, a desire is basically a disposition to bring about the desire’s content. First, I argue that two rival views on the nature of desire, the evaluative theory and the deontic theory, fall prey to the problem of the death of desire and that, when one tries to develop a plausible version of these theories which is able to overcome this problem, one ends up with a view that is not relevantly different from the evaluative view. Second, I respond to some objections to the claim that motivations are sufficient for desire, namely, the Radioman objection and the objection that some motivational states like intentions and habits are not desires
Deontic logic · Disposition · Epistemology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |