A framework for presence in digital contexts

The aim of this paper is to offer an explanatory framework for affirming that one can be genuinely present in digital contexts.This is a challenging task because it is often assumed that no such framework can be successfully articulated.Presence is commonly studied through the experience of being present, that is, through the sense of presence (SoP), and this experience is often characterized as a kind of illusion.Although studying presence through SoP is entirely reasonable, my proposal requires defusing the main theoretical reasons for treating SoP as illusory.Objections come from phenomenological-based theories and some assumptions on the structure of mind within Human Computer Interaction research.After providing an independent argument (based on attention-based digital cooperation) for the need to appeal to genuine presence in digital contexts, I assess both phenomenological-based theories and Human Computer Interaction assumptions that support the illusion view.Against this background, I offer a framework in which presence is not an illusory phenomenon.This framework delineates presence in terms of a theory of attention and its connection to task resolution.On the framework I propose, a subject is present in a digital context insofar as they can exercise attention there, and this attentional exercise is constituted by digital objects, tasks, and normative structures

Appeal · Illusion · Normative · Innovative Human-Technology Interaction · Personal Information Management and User Behavior · Usability and User Interface Design