Resilient Autocrats
Negotiation vs. Repression in War and Rebellion in Post-Soviet Eurasia
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21564847 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mikhail Troitskiy (0000-0002-6997-6656) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 41 |
| Pages | 491-517 |
| Publication date | 2025-12-19 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Negotiation Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0748-4526 • E-ISSN: 1571-9979 |
| Publisher | MIT Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1162/ngtn.a.36 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 16 |
This article examines how authoritarian leaders manage intragovernmental conflict following major shocks. Using comparative process tracing and counterfactual analysis, it analyzes Russia (Putin), Kazakhstan (Tokayev), and Belarus (Lukashenko). The argument is that personalist leaders remain constrained by coalition maintenance and, when feasible, employ intra‐regime bargaining and policy accommodation rather than exclusive reliance on repression. Pre‐2022 Russia and post‐January 2022 Kazakhstan displayed negotiated adjustments that mitigated elite defection risks; post‐2020 Belarus, by contrast, relied on comprehensive repression and external patronage, producing dependence and low domestic maneuverability. The findings clarify how regime type, temporal evolution, and external support condition the payoffs to negotiation versus coercion, contributing to research on authoritarian power‐sharing and crisis management
Process-Tracing Methods
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
The Political Economy of Dictatorship
The Logic of Political Survival
Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships
Offsetting Audience Costs
The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government
Do elites matter in Russian foreign policy? The gap between self-perception and influence
What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years
Counterfactuals, Causal Inference, and Historical Analysis
Democracy by Mistake
Elite Defection under Autocracy
Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |