Is Aquinas’s Doctrine of Analogy Really Unintelligible

Thomas Williams maintains that the doctrine of analogy is unintelligible. In this paper, I scrutinize and reject Williams’s argument for that claim insofar as it applies to Thomas Aquinas’s particular version of the doctrine. After laying out Williams’s critique, I present an account of Aquinas’s conception of analogy. I identify three components of it: a semantic part, a metaphysical part, and a distinctive conception of inference. I briefly explain how all three of these components play a role in Aquinas’s philosophical theology. On the basis of these ideas, I proceed to demonstrate how Williams’s argument against analogy, understood as a set of reasons for rejecting Aquinas’s version of it, fails completely. I end by pointing out how hard it appears for anyone who rejects the doctrine of analogy to keep faith with the idea of creation ex nihilo

Analogy · Doctrine · Epistemology · Faith · Metaphysics · Theology · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil