Questions, Presuppositions and Fallacies

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21583246
AutoresAlexander Moldovan (0000-0002-9435-519X, Universidad de Salamanca, autor de correspondencia)
Año2022
Volumen36
Número2
Páginas287-303
Fecha de publicación2022-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaArgumentation (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0920-427X • E-ISSN: 1572-8374
EditorialSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10503-022-09566-6
OpenAlexW4220771097
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5
Referencias citadas37

In this paper I focus on the fallacy known as Complex Question or Many Questions. After a brief introduction, in Sect. 2 I highlight its pragmatic dimension, and in Sect. 3 its dialectical dimension. In Sect. 4 I present two accounts of this fallacy developed in argumentation theory, Douglas Walton’s and the Pragma-Dialectics’, which have resources to capture both its pragmatic and its dialectical nature. However, these accounts are unsatisfactory for various reasons. In Sect. 5 I focus on the pragmatic dimension of the fallacy and I suggest amendments to the accounts mentioned drawing on the study of the phenomenon of presupposition in theoretical pragmatics. I argue that the central notion in the definition of the fallacy is that of an informative presupposition. In Sect. 6 I focus on the dialectical dimension of the fallacy. This dimension needs to be explicitly acknowledged in the definition of the fallacy in order to distinguish it from a different, non-dialectical, fallacious argumentative move involving presuppositions

Argumentation theory · Dialectic · Epistemology · Fallacy · Phenomenon · Presupposition · Pure mathematics · Sociology · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition · Mathematics · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education