The Locus of Agency in Extended Cognitive Systems

Bibliographic Data

ID21584419
AuthorsBarbara Tomczyk (0000-0001-8145-7755, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume55
Issue4
Pages579-604
Publication date2024-12-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal for General Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0925-4560 • E-ISSN: 0044-2216
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10838-023-09666-1
OpenAlexW4389507443
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited63

The increasing popularity of artificial cognitive enhancements raises the issue of their impact on the agent’s personal autonomy, and issues pertaining to how the latter is to be secured. The extended mind thesis implies that mental states responsible for autonomous action can be partly constituted by the workings of cognitive artifacts themselves, and the question then arises of whether this commits one to embracing an extended agent thesis. My answer is negative. After briefly presenting the main accounts on the conditions for autonomous agency, and analyzing how the latter can be protected from threats posed by the use of cognitive artifacts, I argue that autonomous agency is essentially tied to conscious experience and intentionality, which in turn can only be attributed to the human part of any extended cognitive system. I present both theoretical (conceptual) and practical arguments against recognizing the entire extended system, composed of one human and an artifact, as an autonomous agent

Autonomy · Cognition · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Intentionality · Philosophy of science · Political science · Popularity · Sense of agency · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Law · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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