Reading phenomenology mechanistically
The way through constraints
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21591672 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michał Piekarski (0000-0002-9482-526X, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 1077-1090 |
| Publication date | 2024-07-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2022.2067035 |
| OpenAlex | W4224293900 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 32 |
Marek Pokropski’s “Mechanisms and Consciousness Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science” reopens the question about the possibility of naturalization of phenomenology. The author adopts the position of nonreductive mechanistic integration, which, he claims, has offered new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness. In this paper, I outline the context of the discussions on the relationship between phenomenology and cognitive sciences, and (§2) discuss the approach proposed by Pokropski, pointing out the main arguments and the most important research achievements. Then I focus on some difficulties of this position. The first of these I associate with a procedure which I call a dismemberment of phenomenology (§3). The second (§4) concerns the concept of constraint, which is key to Pokropski’s analyzes, and some consequences of its application and alternative reading. Finally, in §5 I draw attention to two difficulties. The first is whether it is possible to read phenomenology in terms of functional analysis; the second is related to the doubt whether psychological or phenomenological functional explanations can be treated as mechanistic (which is a strong premise of Pokropski’s argument). In Conclusion I make an overall assessment of the presented approach
Cognition · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Epistemology · Premise · Cognitive Science and Education Research · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology
Phenomenological Psychology
Phenomenology of Perception
The Idea of Phenomenology
Explaining the Brain
Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy
Functional Analysis
Materialism and Qualia
From Generative Models to Generative Passages
On the psychologism of neurophenomenology
Phenomenology and functional analysis. A functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology
Applied phenomenology
Integrating psychology and neuroscience
Models and mechanisms in psychological explanation
Functional analysis and mechanistic explanation
Dynamic mechanistic explanation
Mechanistic Causation and Constraints
Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |