Probability fixed points, (in)adequate concept possession and Covid-19 irrationalities

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21591700
AutoresC Kyriacou (0000-0002-1506-1602, University of Cyprus, autor correspondente), Nicos Stylianou (University of Cyprus)
Ano2023
Volume36
Fascículo6
Páginas1037-1061
Data de publicação2023-08-18
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2023.2202184
OpenAlexW4365447101
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas34

We argue that probability mistakes indicate that at least some of us often do not adequately possess the concept of probability (and its cognates) and that the digital dissemination of such misinformation helps foster collective irrationalities (e.g., COVID-19 underestimation and vaccination hesitancy), with detrimental effect for society. Such probability mistakes betray that at least some of us often do not grasp necessary conditions on the concept of probability, what we call probability fixed points. Our case study that illustrates this phenomenon in action is the recent COVID-19 pandemic. We present paradigmatic examples of probability mistakes during the COVID-19 pandemic and explain how such mistakes are especially prone to help create digital epistemic bubbles and echo chambers (cf. Nguyen (2020 Nguyen, C. T. (2020). Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Episteme, 17(2), 141–161. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.32[Crossref] , [Google Scholar])) that foster collective irrationalities, such as COVID-19 underestimation and skepticism and vaccination hesitancy

Computer security · Conditional probability · Economics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Misinformation · Pandemic · Skepticism · Sociology · Statistics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Medicine · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment