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Trust, trustworthiness, and testimonial injustice

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21591747
AutoresAnne Mcglynn (0000-0003-0386-2039, Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen37
Número1
Páginas126-147
Fecha de publicación2024-01-02
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2022.2133695
OpenAlexW4319844554
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas21

A theme running through Katherine Hawley’s recent works on trust and trustworthiness is that thinking about the relations between these and Miranda Fricker’s notion of testimonial injustice offers a perspective from which we can see several limitations of Fricker’s own account of testimonial injustice. This paper clarifies the aspects of Fricker’s account that Hawley’s criticisms target, focusing on her objections to Fricker’s proposal that its primary harm involves a kind of epistemic objectification and her characterization of testimonial injustice in terms of prejudicial credibility deficits. I also offer an assessment of the potency of Hawley’s objections, concluding that they do point to genuine limitations of Fricker’s account, but that we can appreciate Hawley’s points without adopting her trust-centric approach to testimonial injustice, or her specific commitment-based accounts of trust and trustworthiness. However, in the last section I examine the positive picture of testimonial injustice that emerges from Hawley’s discussion of unequally distributed obstacles to both being trustworthy and maintaining a reputation for trustworthy testimony in her recent book How To Be Trustworthy, considering how this picture contrasts with Fricker’s account and where it might have important affinities with other accounts in the literature

Credibility · Epistemology · Harm · Injustice · Sociology · Testimonial · Trustworthiness · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology