Is Ur-intentionality genuine intentionality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21591752 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Agostino Pinna Pintor (University of Turin, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Pages | 1-19 |
| Publication date | 2025-11-05 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2025.2583394 |
| OpenAlex | W4415947084 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 37 |
Intentionality is typically taken to be the property of mental states to be about or represent things, properties, and states of affairs. Thus, it seems uncontroversial to claim that intentional properties are representational in kind. Some scholars, however, remain unpersuaded about it. According to them, intentional properties are not representational, for there can be Ur-intentional states without representational content. The goal of this paper is to challenge the idea that Ur-intentionality is a kind of contentless intentionality, and hold that this nonstandard notion of intentionality entails a number of undesirable consequences. As a result, intentionality is still to be taken as the capacity of the mind to represent, and thus any case of contentless intentional state seems a case of contentless representational state, pace Ur-intentionalism
Externalism · Intentionality · Mental state · Pace · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories
Subjectivity and Selfhood
Representation Reconsidered
Towards Non-Being
Enactivist Interventions
Origins of Objectivity
Explaining Behavior
Evolving Enactivism
The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality
Life and Mind
Intentionality
Against Characterizing Mental States as Propositional Attitudes
Non-Propositional Attitudes
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |