Mental representation, “standing-in-for”, and internal models

Bibliographic Data

ID21591759
AuthorsRosa Cao (0000-0002-1726-477X, Stanford University), Jared Warren (0000-0003-4028-7969, Stanford University, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume38
Issue2
Pages379-396
Publication date2025-02-17
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2023.2207594
OpenAlexW4378376919
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited22

Talk of ”mental representations” is ubiquitous in the philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive science. A slogan common to many different approaches says that representations ”stand in for” the things they represent. We argue that this slogan is either false or uninformative. We then offer a new slogan that aims to do better. The new slogan ties the role of representations to the cognitive role played by the deliverances of perception. After clarifying the new slogan and warding off some misunderstandings, we discuss how the new slogan still captures the seed of truth in the old, point to some specific misunderstandings that can be avoided, and then suggest some ways that the new slogan is useful in the project of giving a satisfying philosophical theory of representation

Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Mental representation · Perception · Political science · Slogan · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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