Conscious vision guides motor action—rarely
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21591767 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Benjamin Kozuch (0000-0002-1550-213X, University of Alabama, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2023 |
| Volumen | 36 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 443-476 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2023-04-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Editorial | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2022.2044461 |
| OpenAlex | W4214951072 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
| Referencias citadas | 142 |
According to Milner and Goodale’s dual visual systems (DVS) theory, a division obtains between visual consciousness and motor action, in that the visual system producing conscious vision (the ventral stream) is distinct from the one guiding action (the dorsal stream). That there would be this division is often taken (by Andy Clark and others) to undermine the folk view on how consciousness and action relate. However, even if this division obtains, this leaves open the possibility that conscious ventral information is often transmitted to the unconscious dorsal stream and then used to guide action, a possibility seeming to preserve a significant role for consciousness in action. This article assesses this possibility. In course of doing so, we will review those arguments recently having been made against the DVS view on how visual consciousness and action relate (ones due to, e.g., Briscoe and Schwenkler, or Schenk and McIntosh). What we will find is that, if we properly analyze the data upon which these arguments are based, we are still left with the impression that the DVS view is largely correct; i.e., it is only rarely that visual experience guides action
Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Linguistics · Perception · Psychoanalysis · Unconscious mind · Vision for perception and vision for action · Visual perception · Action Observation and Synchronization · Communication · Mathematics · Motor Control and Adaptation · Neurology and Historical Studies · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Psychology
The Conscious Brain
Attention
Explaining Behavior
Why visual attention and awareness are different
Attention and consciousness
Towards a true neural stance on consciousness
Size-contrast illusions deceive the eye but not the hand
Two visual systems re-viewed
Perceptual-Cognitive Expertise in Sport
Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness
Ten Problems of Consciousness
Perception, Action, and Consciousness
Is Vision for Action Unconscious
Differential effects of a visual illusion on online visual guidance in a stable environment and online adjustments to perturbations
Are there unconscious perceptual processes
Grasping Spatial Relationships
Through the forest of motor representations
A distinction concerning vision-for-action and affordance perception
Semantic and pragmatic integration in vision for action
The two-visual-systems hypothesis and the perspectival features of visual experience
Neuromotor Mechanisms in Human Communication
Anti-intellectualist motor knowledge
Between vision and action
Visual Experience and Motor Action
Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception
What Reaching Teaches
Consciousness and Action
Between Perception and Action
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 3 |