The complexity of neural responses to visual stimuli
On Carruthers’ challenge to Block’s overflow argument
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21591773 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Damiano La Manna (0000-0003-2385-1935, Department of Philosophy, Damiano La Manna Is at University of Sheffield, UK, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 233-253 |
| Publication date | 2021-02-17 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2020.1862781 |
| OpenAlex | W3117018889 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 27 |
Ned Block’s overflow argument purports to establish that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness is independent of the neural basis of access consciousness. In a recent paper, Block’s argument has been challenged by Peter Carruthers. Carruthers concedes the truth of one of the argument’s key steps, namely, that phenomenal consciousness overflows what is in working memory. At the same time, he rejects the conclusion of the argument by developing an account of this overflow that is alternative to Block’s. In this paper, I argue that Carruthers’ account does not pose a real threat to the overflow argument. The overall plausibility of Carruthers’ account rests on the empirical plausibility of a claim concerning global broadcasting which, albeit intuitively plausible in light of a lightly-sketched picture of the impact of attention upon neural matters, he offers no sufficient empirical evidence for. Drawing on some important imaging studies that reveal striking facts about neural responses to visual stimuli, I argue for two intimately related claims: first, that the intuitive plausibility of claims like Carruthers’ is not a guarantee of empirical plausibility; second, that as concers the same claims, strong empirical evidence is needed before confident judgments of empirical plausibility can reasonably be formulated
Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Empirical evidence · Empirical research · Epistemology · Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies · Neural dynamics and brain function · Philosophy · Psychology · Visual perception and processing mechanisms
The Conscious Brain
The magical number 4 in short-term memory
The distinct modes of vision offered by feedforward and recurrent processing
Consciousness cannot be separated from function
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
The information available in brief visual presentations.
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness
Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing
Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
The capacity of visual working memory for features and conjunctions
Working Memory, Thought, and Action
In Praise of Poise
| Highly cited | No |
|---|