“What are we doing when we are reading?”
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21591786 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Francesca Secco (0000-0003-2732-3195, University of Antwerp, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 3741-3763 |
| Publication date | 2025-11-17 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2024.2387825 |
| OpenAlex | W4401544771 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 62 |
When we read a list of words, are we doing something, or is it something that just happens to us? On the one hand, according to intention-for-action theories, reading can be active only if we do it intentionally, meaning that the action is caused and sustained by the agent’s intention. Many cases of reading seem to be intentional: consider, for instance, when a person is reading a novel, a newspaper article, or an academic paper. Yet, reading often seems to be something that passively happens to us. It is sufficient that a word appears in front of us to make us read it. Numerous studies on the Stroop task – a well-known experimental set-up in the cognitive sciences – make clear that reading is unavoidable, suggesting that reading takes place regardless of the agent’s intention. This tension constitutes the reading puzzle. I argue that if intention is necessary for a process to be active, then intention-for-action theories fail to account for such a distinctive human activity as reading. I conclude that reading represents a real challenge to the intention-for-action theories and shows that what an agent can actively do should not be limited to behaviors that involve intentions
Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Linguistics · Action Observation and Synchronization · Computer Science · Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason
The representing brain
Controlling Attitudes
Controlled and automatic human information processing
Learning to Read Words
The phenomenology of action
On the control of automatic processes
Automaticity in the reading circuitry
Slow Reading in a Hurried Age
Judging as a non-voluntary action
Essays on Actions and Events
Half a century of research on the Stroop effect
Reading as a source of knowledge
Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action
Action Unified
Automaticity
Reading, Fast and Slow
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |