If intentional objects are objects for a subject, how are they related
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21591922 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alberto Voltolini (0000-0003-0400-1978, University of Turin, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 1136-1151 |
| Publication date | 2022-11-17 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2022.2035342 |
| OpenAlex | W4210317839 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 16 |
Tim Crane has put forward a theory of intentional objects (intentionalia), which has taken up again and expanded by Casey Woodling. Crane’s theory is articulated in three main theses: a) every intentional state, or thought, is about an intentional object; b) taken as such, whether or not it exists, an intentional object is a schematic object; c) taken as such, whether or not it exists, an intentional object is a phenomenological object. In this paper, I will try to show that theses b) and c) can hardly be defended together, unless, in order to redirect and strengthen Crane’s theory two further claims are simultaneously defended. First, certain intentionalia may be the same as other such objects without being identical with them, and second, from a metaphysical point of view outside phenomenology, the particular intentionalia involved by this sui generis sameness relation of appearing as an aspectual alter-ego of weaker than identity are concrete objects
Aesthetics · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Epistemology · Id, ego and super-ego · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Schematic · Computer Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Highly cited | No |
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