Unpacking how the biomedical model prioritizes the subpersonal level in mental health inquiry
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21591968 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nicolò Gaj (0000-0001-6089-178X, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Pages | 1-29 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-25 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2025.2523554 |
| OpenAlex | W4411635798 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 72 |
Biomedical accounts of mental health problems represent the dominant outlook among both academics and practitioners. Yet, there is growing awareness of the theoretical and practical limitations of this approach. In this paper, I first identify three levels of inquiry in mental health, each reflecting a different metatheoretical perspective and generating distinct research questions: the subpersonal, personal, and superpersonal. Next, I illustrate their reciprocal interplay through a contrastive conception of causation whereby causes are defined against the backdrop of the set of assumptions associated with a given level of inquiry. I then argue that the perspective conveyed in the main document used to classify mental health problems – the DSM – is fully biomedical and, as such, tends to prioritize one level of inquiry: the subpersonal. The dominance of the subpersonal level stems from an ideal of science that serves to legitimize mental health disciplines as natural sciences. Yet, this dominance risks obscuring or underrating major personal and superpersonal factors that may have a bearing upon mental health problems. In conclusion, I contend that redistributing the focus of inquiry to include greater scrutiny of the personal and superpersonal domains would increase the scope – and effectiveness – of scientific accounts of mental health issues
Cognitive science · Epistemology · Mental health · Mental model · Psychotherapist · Unpacking · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Personality Disorders and Psychopathology · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychotherapy Techniques and Applications
Constructing the Subject
What's Behind the Research? Discovering Hidden Assumptions in the Behavioral Sciences
Diagnostic Cultures
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
The Structure of Science
The biomedical model of mental disorder
The myth of mental illness.
The Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology (HiTOP)
The Need for a New Medical Model
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry
The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction Revisited
Why the professional practice of psychology requires a personalistic account of psychological phenomena
Philosophy of Epidemiology
Why mental disorders are brain disorders. And why they are not
Supporting the sustainability of Mad Studies and preventing its co-option
Searching for a rose garden
On the persistence of psychiatric diagnosis
Beyond biological and social normativity
Epidemics from the Population Perspective
Contrastive Causation
Open Letter to the DSM-5
What Might an Alternative to the DSM Suitable for Psychotherapists Look Like
Standards and Guidelines for the Development of Diagnostic Nomenclatures and Alternatives in Mental Health Research and Practice
Fundamental Flaws of the DSM
DSM-5
DSM-5
Does “Psychological Dysfunction” Mean Anything? A Critical Essay on Pathology Versus Agency
Where is psychology going? Structural fault lines revealed by psychologists' use of Kuhn
The Power Threat Meaning Framework
Scientific Perspectivism
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |