Authority or autonomy? Philosophical and psychological perspectives on deference to experts

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21591973
AutoresAlex Worsnip (0000-0002-3757-3756, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, autor de correspondencia), Devin Lane (0009-0007-5578-0373, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Samuel Pratt (0009-0006-3129-7953, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), M Giulia Napolitano (0000-0002-3122-0845, Erasmus University Rotterdam), Kurt Gray (0000-0001-5816-2676, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Jeffrey A Greene (0000-0003-4145-1847, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
Año2026
Volumen39
Número4
Páginas1633-1668
Fecha de publicación2026-05-19
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2025.2475138
OpenAlexW4408323307
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas115

Several decades of work in both philosophy and psychology acutely highlights our limitations as individual inquirers. One way to recognize these limitations is to defer to experts: roughly, to form one’s beliefs on the basis of expert testimony. Yet, as has become salient in the age of Brexit, Trumpist politics, and climate change denial, people are often mistrustful of experts, and unwilling to defer to them. It’s a trope of highbrow public discourse that this unwillingness is a serious pathology. But to what extent is this trope accurate? Answering this requires us to settle both a normative question – under exactly what conditions ought we to defer to experts? – and an empirical question – under what conditions are people willing to defer to experts? The first question has been investigated primarily by philosophers; the second, primarily by psychologists. Yet there is little work integrating these literatures and putting together their results. The aim of this review article is to begin this task, enabling us to begin reaching conclusions about how much real practices of deference diverge from the ideal. We present an opinionated guide to relevant work from both philosophy and psychology, and note places where the literature has important gaps

Autonomy · Deference · Epistemology · Political science · Psychological science · Climate Change Communication and Perception · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology