Disrupted self, therapy, and the limits of conversational AI

Bibliographic Data

ID21591983
AuthorsDina Babushkina (0000-0003-4899-8319, University of Twente, corresponding author), Bas De Boer (0000-0002-2009-2198, University of Twente)
Year2026
Volume39
Issue2
Pages318-344
Publication date2026-02-17
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2024.2397004
OpenAlexW4402171658
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited58

Conversational agents (CA) are thought to be promising for psychotherapy because they give the impression of being able to engage in conversations with human users. However, given the high risk for therapy patients who are already in a vulnerable situation, there is a need to investigate the extent to which CA are able to contribute to therapy goals and to discuss CA’s limitations, especially in complex cases. In this paper, we understand psychotherapy as a way of dealing with existential situations and position CAs in the context of the therapeutic experience of patients. This experience is determined by the patient’s unique personal context and specific therapy goals. We suggest that psychotherapy is a fundamentally dialogical activity, because it crucially involves work on the self and one’s self-narrative. This brings us to our central question: is it possible for CAs to engage in a productive therapeutic dialogue, given their limitations as epistemic agents? We will discuss several of those limitations, show how these undermine the possibility of engaging in a therapeutic dialogue, and illustrate those limitations through discussions of the cases of grief and abuse

Cognitive science · Epistemology · Digital Mental Health Interventions · Mental Health Research Topics · Mental Health via Writing · Philosophy · Psychology

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access