Dynamicism, radical enactivism, and representational cognitive processes

The case of subitization

Bibliographic Data

ID21591985
AuthorsMisha Ash (University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA), Rex Welshon (0000-0002-3413-781X, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume33
Issue8
Pages1096-1120
Publication date2020-11-16
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2020.1775798
OpenAlexW3036837313
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited98

The role of representational cognitive processes (RCPs) in theories of cognition remains a source of disagreement in philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience. These debates are stoked by arguments that purport to show that RCPs neither receive support from nor support computational theories of cognition, and that dynamicist Embodied, Embedded, Extended (3E) and radical enactivist views of cognition show that RCPs can either be taken out of our heads or dispensed with entirely. We argue that these criticisms fail. We review familiar arguments for thinking that cognitive processes are representational. Next, we consider the challenge that RCPs neither support nor are supported by computational views of cognition, as well as the challenge that neuro-computational RCPs are rendered superfluous by dynamicist views of cognition. We then consider the challenge that intracranial RCPs are rendered superfluous by 3E and radical enactivist views of cognition. We grant that representation is neither necessary nor sufficient for computation. However, we argue that independent reasons support the explanatory utility of neuro-computational RCPs in dynamicist and 3E accounts of cognition and that radical enactivism’s claim that all RCPs are extracranial is mistaken about at least one species of cognitive processing, that of subitizing

Autopoiesis · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Embodied cognition · Enactivism · Epistemology · Internalism and externalism · Child and Animal Learning Development · Cognitive and developmental aspects of mathematical skills · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Psychology

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