Teleosemantics and the hard problem of content

Bibliographic Data

ID21592011
AuthorsStephen Francis Mann (0000-0002-4136-8595, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany, corresponding author), Ross Pain (0000-0002-5354-6301, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia)
Year2022
Volume35
Issue1
Pages22-46
Publication date2022-01-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2021.1942814
OpenAlexW3176038052
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited35

Hutto and Myin claim that teleosemantics cannot account for mental content. In their view, teleosemantics accounts for a poorer kind of relation between cognitive states and the world but lacks the theoretical tools to account for a richer kind. We show that their objection imposes two criteria on theories of content: a truth-evaluable criterion and an intensionality criterion. For the objection to go through, teleosemantics must be subject to both these criteria and must fail to satisfy them. We argue that teleosemantics meets the truth-evaluable criterion and is not required to meet the intensionality criterion. We conclude that Hutto and Myin’s objection fails

Economics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Cognitive Science and Education Research · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science

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