Capacity, attributability, and responsibility in mental disorder

In this commentary on Anneli Jefferson’s Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders? I endorse her capacitarian approach to responsibility but suggest that the effects of at least some mental/brain disorders on the agent’s psychology show that we cannot neatly separate the epistemic condition from the control condition when assessing agential capacity. I then discuss the labeling issue in the context of rival attributionist accounts of responsibility which hold that agents are responsible if their actions are attributable to them. The incorporation of mental disorders into identity through social processes may open agents with mental or brain disorders open to unfair blame. However, we cannot fully understand the effects of the disorders on agential capacity without closely attending to the social environment that shapes the way the disorder is conceived, enacted, perceived, and responded to over time

Addiction · Blame · Compatibilism · Epistemology · Mental capacity · Moral responsibility · Psychiatry · Psychotherapist · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Psychology · Social Psychology

• “Terminal Anorexia”, Treatment Refusal and Decision-Making Capacity

  Open Access•Ann Jefferson•Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare…•2024

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