Memory without identity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21592136 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Morgan (0000-0002-2770-402X, University of York, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 1182-1200 |
| Publication date | 2025-04-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2024.2367077 |
| OpenAlex | W4399740251 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 13 |
I defend the view that episodic memory judgments do not depend on any kind of identification of oneself as the person whose past is being remembered, and are therefore logically (rather than merely de facto) immune from error through misidentification relative to “I”. There are two challenges to this view that have been pressed in the literature. One appeals to the idea of background presuppositions of identity and says that “I am the person from whom my memory impression derives” is a background presupposition of any memory judgment. The other appeals to wh-misidentification and says there are possible cases in which memory goes astray that should be counted as cases of error through wh-misidentification. Although the details are different, the core thought behind both challenges is the same: Shoemaker’s thought that there could be a memory-like relation that one stands in to another’s past. I think this thought is a mistake
Aesthetics · Cognitive science · Psychoanalysis · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |