Mental disorders as processes

A more suited metaphysics for psychiatry

Bibliographic Data

ID21592181
AuthorsElly Vintiadis (0000-0003-2782-9348, Department of History, Philosophy and the Ancient World, Deree - the American College of Greece, Athens, Greece, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume37
Issue2
Pages487-504
Publication date2024-02-17
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2022.2101443
OpenAlexW4285491106
LanguageEN
References cited24

In this paper I argue that thinking in terms of process metaphysics and seeing the mind and mental disorders as processual in nature allows for a more complete understanding of mental disorders than is allowed by non-processual frameworks, while it also allows us to incorporate what we currently know about them. In addition, it can address problems in psychiatry that arise when we ask the wrong kinds of questions that naturally arise within a non-processual metaphysical framework. In this paper I address the problems of reductionism, essentialism and dualism

Cognitive science · Dualism · Epistemology · Essentialism · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Reductionism · Computer Science · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Mental Health Research Topics · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychotherapy Techniques and Applications

Tools

Open DOI