The Libet paradigm and a dilemma for epiphenomenalism

Bibliographic Data

ID21592288
AuthorsBradford Stockdale (0000-0002-1993-3324, University of West Florida, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume37
Issue8
Pages2244-2261
Publication date2024-11-16
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2022.2130744
OpenAlexW4301594757
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited34

Epiphenomenalism is the thesis that though physical events may cause mental events, those mental events never cause physical events. In this paper, I will be concerned with the claim that our thoughts, intentions, and awareness play no causal role in producing actions. Though epiphenomenalism has been defended with a priori philosophical arguments, the majority of the support that it has gained in recent years has come from advances in neuroscience. At the center of these experiments is the Libet paradigm that aims to show that our actions are initiated by unconscious brain processes prior to our awareness of the intention or decision to perform the corresponding actions. It has been widely suggested that these studies support the view that consciousness is epiphenomenal, and if Libet-style experiments support this conclusion, the results have direct implications for free will. I argue by way of a dilemma that any study that relies on reports of subjects’ awareness in its methodology cannot be used to support epiphenomenalism because the experimenters would have to rule out the possibility that consciousness plays a causal role in order to do so

Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Dilemma · Epistemology · Free will · Unconscious mind · Free Will and Agency · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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