Weakness of Will and Practical Identity

In this article, I develop an Augustinian response to some contemporary philosophical proposals concerning the problem of weakness of will. I argue that many philosophers tend to cast the problem in terms of irrationality, focusing on psychological components such as judgment, desire, and resolution. In contrast, I contend that weakness of will has more to do with the absence of a coherent conception of practical identity and with a misleading conception of practical identity that overestimates the agent’s normative and motivational capacities. I claim that the irrationality of the weak-willed agent is at best a symptom, rather than the ultimate source, of weakness of will which cannot be properly understood without first addressing the deficiency of our internal resources relative to our willing and doing

Aesthetics · Economics · Epistemology · Irrationality · Normative · Positive economics · Rationality · Sociology · Weakness · Augustinian Studies and Theology · Free Will and Agency · Medicine · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

• Corporate Weakness of Will

  Open Access•Kenneth Silver•Journal of Business Ethics•2025

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