Economic narratives and international migration under liberalization

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Bibliographic Data

ID2159605
AuthorsJon Jonakin
Year2012
Volume41
Issue2
Pages177-198
Publication date2012-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomy and Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0308-5147 • E-ISSN: 1469-5766
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/03085147.2012.661624
OpenAlexW1978038925
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited28

Whereas orthodox economists supported the liberalization of goods and capital markets in the current global era, they typically assumed away the need to liberalize labour markets at an international level. The unexpected rise and then persistence of international immigration indicated the shortcomings of the orthodox account in theory and practice. Various recurring and contradictory or unsupported narratives were developed to 'explain away' the necessity or desirability of a policy of free migration, and this in spite of an ideology that otherwise promoted liberalization and choice in matters affecting goods and factor markets. There was, finally, a normative contradiction at the core of the orthodox account. Keywords: international migrationliberalizationLatin Americamarket failure Notes 1. Orthodox economists were understood as those who worked from the Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions wherein the prescription of free trade in goods – and implicitly in capital and labour – yielded unambiguous net benefits at the global level. When the standard, positive narrative was amended with the New Trade Theory's incorporation of market failures, orthodox economists—'some of the creators of the new theory themselves' – preserved their preferred (orthodox) 'normative conclusion': an eschewal of any role for government intervention in favour of the now visible hand of imperfect markets in a second-best world (Krugman, 1987, pp. 138–9). 2. The details of immigration rules were intricate and arcane with twenty-four general and seventy-two specific types of visas. In 2004, upwards of 133,427 Mexican business professionals of various categories were granted such temporary visas (Wasem, 2005, pp. 3, 6–7, 10). 3. In the 1965 legislation, annual immigration was set at 290,000 with Western hemisphere nations permitted 120,000 individuals from that total (Ngai, 2004, pp. 258–64). 4. The case presented here does not pretend to undertake a comprehensive review of the literature of orthodox opinion on migration; rather, the intent is to highlight the recurring themes in the literature. 5. The figures for Western Europe began with 1965. 6. More recently, Jokisch (2007, p. 4) reported a figure of 1.5 million Ecuadorian emigrants that, from a 2001 population of 12.9 million, indicated 11.6 per cent of the population had emigrated. 7. Although Western hemisphere immigrants faced no formal quotas, by 1929 and moved by nativist and economic arguments, the US government began to restrict Mexican immigration through administrative means: fees and the denial of visas related to contract labour, literacy tests and the likelihood of becoming a 'public charge', among others (Ngai, 2004 Ngai, M. 2004. Impossible subjects: Illegal aliens and the making of modern America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar], pp. 54–90). 8. While most newly arriving immigrants were undocumented, the number of undocumented immigrants in 2005 accounted for only 30 per cent of all foreign-born individuals (Passel, 2006 Passel , J. 2006 . The size characteristics of the unauthorized migrant population in the U.S . Research Report . Washington , DC : Pew Hispanic Center . [Google Scholar], p. 3). 9. This assumption is a mainstay of the standard, orthodox textbook treatment. The horizontal axis of a graph indicates a given level of global investment in the home and foreign country. Rental rates for capital (on the vertical axis) are assumed to be different, and FDI flows from the Global North (with its lower rates) to the Global South (with its higher rates). Investment levels rise in the Global South and drop in the Global North, while overall investment is fixed by assumption (see Feenstra & Taylor, 2011 Feenstra, R. and Taylor, A. 2011. International trade, 2nd edn, New York: Worth Publishers. [Google Scholar], p. 161). 10. As with the wage and fiscal effects of migration, the literature indicated that the impact of FDI on host investment could be ambiguous (Ocampo & Vos, 2008 Ocampo, J. and Vos, R. 2008. Uneven economic development, New York: Zed Books. [Google Scholar], p. 84). 11. See Palma (2003) for data on the wage/productivity divergence and the decline of labour's share of GDP. 12. For someone wishing to discount nativism or racism as an explanation for immigration policy, Williamson's repeated use of the lurid 'breed' to predicate his relationship was as unfortunate as it was suggestive. Additional informationNotes on contributorsJon JonakinJon Jonakin studied economics at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. He is currently professor of economics at Tennessee Technological University. He has published articles in the Journal of Development Studies, the Review of International Political Economy, the International Journal of Development Issues, World Development and International Migration (forthcoming), among others. His more recent research has involved a critique of the impact of market liberalization and globalization on labour markets in Latin America

Capital (architecture · Contradiction · Economics · Free trade · Ideology · Immigration · International economics · Liberalization · Market economy · Narrative · Normative · Political science · Politics · Global trade and economics · Migration and Labor Dynamics · Taxation and Compliance Studies · Law

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