Margaret MacDonald and Gilbert Ryle
A philosophical friendship
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21597656 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Kremer (0000-0002-4382-817X, University of Chicago, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 288-311 |
| Publication date | 2022-03-04 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09608788.2021.1932409 |
| OpenAlex | W3170292859 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 20 |
This article considers the personal and philosophical relationship between two philosophers, Margaret MacDonald and Gilbert Ryle. I show that a letter from MacDonald to Ryle found at Linacre College, Oxford, was part of an extensive correspondence, and that the two were intimate friends and philosophical interlocutors, and I explore the relationship between their respective philosophies. MacDonald, who studied with Wittgenstein before coming to Oxford in 1937, deployed and developed Wittgensteinian themes in her own subsequent work. I show that this work was an important source of ideas in Ryle’s philosophy. I examine two episodes: (1) a 1937 symposium in which MacDonald gave the lead paper, and Ryle was a respondent – I argue that Ryle derived his famous distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that from her paper; and (2) Ryle’s rejection in Dilemmas (1953/4) of the central importance of the idea of a ‘category mistake’ – I argue that this may have been in response to MacDonald’s critical review of The Concept of Mind. Along the way I consider the development of MacDonald’s metaphilosophical views, and I shed new light on MacDonald’s remarkable biography
Art · Biography · Epistemology · Friendship · Literature · Mistake · Social science · Sociology · Historical Philosophy and Science · Karl Barth and Christian Theology · Law · Philosophy · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
There is no reason for the necessity of the ultimate principles of deduction.’ Margaret Macdonald on logical necessity
Margaret MacDonald’s scientific common-sense philosophy
Limits, Limitations, and Necessity in Margaret Macdonald
“Icons, indices, rhemes, & things!” Margaret Macdonald on propositions in Peirce, Russell, and Wittgenstein
Margaret Macdonald on the definition of art
Helen Knight and Margaret Macdonald on the meaning of ‘good’
The philosopher versus the physicist
Towards a deep epistemology
Macdonald Before Quine on Truth by Convention
Teaching women into the history of early analytic philosophy
Metaphor and Metaphilosophy
Margaret Macdonald on the Argument from Dreaming
| Unique citing works | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |