What can Maimonides' understanding of the shamefulness of touch teach us about Aristotle's NE III.10, 1118b1–3

Bibliographic Data

ID21597665
AuthorsMor Segev (0000-0001-7305-5553, University of South Florida, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume31
Issue3
Pages405-420
Publication date2023-05-04
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09608788.2023.2166899
OpenAlexW4321446267
LanguageEN
References cited22

In NE III.10, 1118b1–3, Aristotle says that the “most shared of the senses is that according to which intemperance [comes about], and it would seem justifiably to be shameful, because it inheres [in us] not insofar as we are human beings, but insofar as we are animals”. This statement appears to describe the sense of touch as shameful. This may seem like a strange position for Aristotle to hold, since elsewhere he describes human touch as the most accurate among animal species, which corresponds to our superior intelligence, and as necessary for animal life. In this paper, I argue that Maimonides nevertheless succeeds in showing that Aristotle has a strong theoretical reason for maintaining that the sense of touch is shameful. Maimonides shows that, based on principles of Aristotelian psychology, human touch is indeed shameful because it obstructs intellectual activity

Epistemology · Human animal · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy

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