A hint as to my grounds for judgement

Frege’s positive account of modality

Bibliographic Data

ID21597701
AuthorsTodd Sanders (0000-0002-0880-8843, University of Duisburg-Essen, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume33
Issue4
Pages885-910
Publication date2025-07-04
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09608788.2024.2445597
OpenAlexW4407224371
LanguageEN
References cited30

Frege’s Begriffsschrift account of modality involves both a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim is that modal notions are logically insignificant; the positive claim is that modals convey a ‘hint’ (Wink) as to the speaker’s grounds for judgement. This paper is about Frege’s positive claim, which has not received much attention. I explain in detail the Fregean notion of hinting and how to distinguish hints from conceptual contents, and I argue that Frege’s two-dimensional account of modal talk is supported by various observations. However, it also seems clear that Frege’s account cannot be the whole story

Epistemology · Judgement · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Linguistics and Discourse Analysis · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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