Later Mohist ethics and philosophical progress in ancient China
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21597745 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel J Stephens (0000-0002-2577-4139, Philosophy, Duke Kunshan University, Kunshan, People’s Republic of China, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 394-414 |
| Publication date | 2021-05-04 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09608788.2020.1816528 |
| OpenAlex | W3091773004 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 7 |
The writings of the later Mohists are generally taken to contain several updates to the consequentialist ethical view held by the Mohist school. In this paper, I defend one interpretation of those updates and how they may have served, within the Mohists’ argumentative context, to make their views more defensible. I argue that we should reject A.C. Graham’s prominent interpretation, on which the later Mohists’ argumentative strategy is to develop a conception of the a priori and to ground their ethical view in a form of a priori rationalism. I contend, instead, that the strength of the later Mohists’ ethical view comes largely from their adoption of a subjective criterion for identifying what counts as a benefit within their consequentialist view. I show how the adoption of this subjective criterion fits within a larger trend in later Mohist thought of coming to terms with the diversity of people’s evaluative standpoints, and further show how it equips the later Mohists with worthwhile responses to their philosophical rivals
A priori and a posteriori · Argumentative · China · Consequentialism · Epistemology · Mohism · Political science · Rationalism · Sociology · Anthropology · Chinese history and philosophy · History · Indian and Buddhist Studies · Law · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |