The developmental potential of the human mind

Hume on children and the formation of fiction

Bibliographic Data

ID21597848
AuthorsElena Gordon (0000-0002-2798-6493, The University of Sydney, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume31
Issue1
Pages58-78
Publication date2023-01-02
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09608788.2022.2137459
OpenAlexW4308484380
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited14

Fictions feature prominently in several of Hume's important arguments about the external world. For example, Hume is clear that there would be no belief in the continued existence of objects, were it not for the fictions that are causally responsible for effecting this belief. Interpreters of Hume on the topic of fiction generally argue that the formation of fiction requires the possession of general ideas and the use of language. Drawing upon recent attempts in the literature to advance this claim, I offer reasons for why this general approach is undesirable. I would also like to thank the John Anderson Bequest at the University of Sydney for the gift that funds the Anderson Postdoctoral Research Fellowship which I hold.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Treatise and 'T' refer to A Treatise of Human Nature. References to this work indicate the book, part, section, and paragraph numbers, followed by the page numbers as given in the Selby-Bigge edition, revised by Nidditch (referred to as "SBN").2 Traditionally, scholars have thought that Hume's use of the term 'fiction' denotes a special class of ideas. Baier, A Progress; Baxter, Hume's Difficulty; McRae, "The Import"; Strawson, The Secret Connexion and The Evident Connexion adopt this position. However, recent arguments by Cottrell and Ainslie, have pointed out that these scholars fail to capture that Hume uses the term 'fiction' to refer to a process of the mind, and to the products of this process. As Cottrell writes, Hume uses "'fiction' in an archaic sense, meaning "the act of feigning or inventing"; in his view, this act is performed by the imagination. Elsewhere, he uses the term 'fiction' to denote the products—the representations—that our imagination produces by such acts" (Cottrell, "A Puzzle", 50).3 This term was first introduced by McRae, "The Import".4 See Costa, "Hume and Belief", "Strict Identity" and "Very Idea"; Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self in Hume's Treatise, 183–88; McRae, "The Import".5 I focus on how Costa and Cottrell establish this interpretive claim, since they devote considerable attention to it in their respective accounts of Humean fictions.6 Some Hume scholars disagree. Wayne Waxman, for example, argues that "Language plays only a marginal role in Hume's account of generality" (Waxman, Theory of Consciousness, 106), and Hume does not deny that non-human animals have general representations. I do not have space to fully consider this position. However, in my view, Hume's emphasis on language throughout "Of abstract ideas" entails that general representation requires a sophisticated command of language that non-human animals lack. Furthermore, Annemarie Butler suggests that as Hume's account of general ideas significantly draws from Berkeley, who explicitly denies that non-human animals could have general ideas, it is likely that Hume followed suit. See Butler, "Hume on Believing", 237n.7.7 Costa focuses on the negative claim that custom should prevent one from uttering false propositions involving general kinds. See Costa, "Strict Identity", 2.8 In the First Enquiry Hume states that we are "extremely liable to error and mistake" at "every age and period of human life" (EHU 5.22; SBN 55). However, Hume makes this claim in relation to the "fallacious deductions of our reason" (EHU 5.22; SBN 55), and not in relation to how custom or habit exerts influence on the mind. Hume consistently maintains that children are prone to errors while forming customs or habits relating to the external world.9 See also Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism, 12.10 'First Enquiry' and 'EHU' refer to An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. References to this work indicate the section and paragraph numbers, followed by the page numbers as given in the Selby-Bigge edition of Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and the Principles of Morals, revised by Nidditch (referred to as "SBN").11 Some commentators worry that aspects of Hume's philosophy are inconsistent between the Treatise and the First and Second Enquiries. Peter Millican, for instance, argues that Hume lost confidence in his Treatise account of associationist psychology in the First Enquiry (Millican, "The Context", 51–2). I can afford to be ecumenical about this dispute. I refer to both Hume's Treatise and First Enquiry since he is consistent that: (i) non-human animal and human reasoning is distinct in degree and not in kind; and (ii) non-human animal and infant reasoning are alike.12 Hume's concession in the Dialogues that "Several expressions of our passions contain a universal language: all brute animals have a natural speech, which, however limited, is very intelligible to their own species" (D 3.4; KS 153) serves as evidence that animals do, in fact have language. But Hume is here clear that their capacity for language is very limited, and not conceptualized as is human speech.13 The child could also infer that the length of the toy's endurance depends on how long they can resist the urge to blink. This shows up in their behaviour when, for example, they crawl towards the toy while the lullaby plays, blink, and react to the toy that appears after the blink as though it is a new toy. Importantly, since we cannot know what infant thought is like, our inferences about their representations must be restricted to what we can observe in their behaviour and to their capabilities.14 'L' stands for Letters of David Hume. References to this work indicate the volume and page numbers of the Greig editions.15 This raises questions about the normative dimensions of cognition in Hume's philosophy. See Schafer, "Correctness and Cognition", for discussion

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